Slightly behind the times on this one, but I spotted in last week's Gazette some analysis by Richard Taylor of the LIFFE Administration & Management v Pinkava & Others [2007] EWCA Civ 217 case from March this year. The case analysed the ownership under s.39 of the Patents Act 1977 of a "system and related inventions which permit the trading on an electronic exchange of various financial instruments not previously so traded" created by Pinkava during his employment by Liffe. The Court of Appeal dismissed Pinkava's appeal and held that the system he invented was owned by Liffe.
The Court looked at the wording of s.39, which states that an invention created by an employee is owned by the employee's employer if:
"(a) it was made in the course of the normal duties of the employee or in the course of duties falling outside his normal duties but specifically assigned to him and the circumstances in either case were such that an invention might reasonably be expected to result from the carrying out of his duties; or
(b) the invention was made in the course of the duties of the employee and, at the time of making the invention, because of the nature of his duties and the particular responsibilities arising from the nature of his duties he had a special obligation to further the interests of the employer’s undertaking."
Two particularly good comments from Justice Jacob in the judgment. First, in assessing the first limb on duties:
"I do not think one can be too precise about how the duty is to be ascertained. The contract and the general nature of the job both call for examination. It is not possible to be too analytical about this. In the end one is asking whether the employee is employed to try to innovate and, if he is, what general sort of areas his innovation duties cover."
I am not quite sure what "it is not possible to be too analytical" means (it could be "any analysis, no matter how extensive, is not excessive" - or the opposite, ie "one should not analyse these things too extensively"). Assuming that he meant the latter, I'm not convinced it's the most helpful guidance (a bit like saying "you know, it's a duty if it's a duty ... it just is ..."). I also like this:
"Where I differ from the Chancellor is in thinking that the particular attributes of the individual employee are a relevant circumstance. I cannot accept that, given all other factors being equal (contract terms, nature of job and so on), there can be a difference as to ownership depending on whether the individual employee is thick or brilliant."
Presumably Jacob felt at liberty to make this comment because the employee in this instance leaned more towards the "brilliant" than the "thick". As Richard Taylor points out, employees are theoretically entitled to compensation under s.40 but this is unlikely to have been of enormous comfort to Pinkava - as Taylor says, "there have been no reported cases of a successful claim under this head".
I've also found IPKat's analysis here and here.