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Blog Mgog

It has been reported that a Welsh blogger has been fined £150 (plus costs) for posting 'menacing messages' on his blog about a police officer who originally interviewed him.

Gavin Brent is reported to have been found guilty under the Telecommunications Act of posting menacing messages. I suspect this is an erroneuous reference to the Communications Act 2003 S. 127, which provides that it is an offence to make improper use of a public telecommunication network. A person who 'sends by means of a public electronic communications network, a message or other matter that is grossly offensive, or of an indecent, obscene or menacing character' is committing an offence.

The offender here wrote something which could be construed as offensive in relation to the police officer's family. Another cautionary tale to all bloggers out there.

Open Source on the Verizon

Traditional software owners can have some difficulty with open source software. Most traditional software proprietors spend vast sums of money creating, developing, testing, upgrading and supporting software for their clients. They then, quite rightly, charge their clients for the software and services which their investment has created. As far as a traditional software proprietor understands the world: I programme it, I sell it.

This is a gross over-simplification, but you get the idea. You can also probably understand why traditional software proprietors struggle with the concept of open source. As far as they (and frequently the public at large) can tell, open source is free; and not just free in terms of "no money" but free in terms of "free to use". It isn't - it's subject to licence terms in the same way as proprietary software, and increasingly the open source community is getting this message across through organisations such as the Software Freedom Law Centre.

Founded in 2005 this body provides 'legal representation and other law-related services to protect and advance free and open source software'. It takes this role quite seriously, and has been issuing lawsuits to enforce open source licence terms. In 2007 they issued a lawsuit against Verizon for not supplying source code to an open source component with their technology (a wireless router) in breach of the relevant open source licence terms. It is reported that Verizon have settled the lawsuit, as of March 2008. Whilst the choice to settle could have been made for any number of reasons, Verizon clearly took this lawsuit seriously in choosing to settle.

Given the number of times I've been asked about this recently, it is clear that traditional software proprietors are starting to take the issues of open source more and more seriously. This also seems to have come at a time when the open source movement itself has started to take the policing of open source more seriously. Nothing raises public (and commercial) consciences as much as a very public lawsuit.

Larry's still not happy

Mark and I went along to the SCL's annual lecture last night to see Prof Larry Lessig talk about "corruption 2.0".  I'd not seen him speak before (though I've followed the output from his blog for some time).  Once I'd got used to his staccato powerpoint style (does every word really need a separate slide for emphasis?), I was (predictably) wowed and convinced by many of his arguments.

I particularly liked his (more familiar) arguments about the scope and effect of copyright insidiously expanding to make contemporary "read write" culture illegal - though his point that legislators do just get things wrong (climate change, copyright extension, recommended diets) - and the lack of US privacy legislation - made me feel suitably indignant.  As I was supposed to feel.

And the "remix" section was great too.  It's never a bad thing to be reminded about some of those classic YouTube moments, such as Blair and Bush duetting to Lionel Ritchie's "Endless Love".  I've always been a big fan of some of the "mashups" my pal William puts on his Christmas compilation CDs, notably including the Beatles' "Christmas Time Is Here Again" with Boston's "More Than a Feeling".

I was only sad that there weren't more people there to see the performance.  In a theatre holding up to 460, I reckon there were no more than 100 people present.  Was this because the SCL had been over-ambitious in its choice of venue?  Or the conflict with the Chelsea v Liverpool match?  Or the fact it was a Wednesday night?  Or is Prof Lessig too radical for the taste of most tech lawyers?

Mental arithmetic ...

Recently I came across the judgment of Floyd J in Kapur v Comptroller General of Patents, Designs and Trade Marks [2008] All ER (D) 142. Mr Kapur wanted to get a patent for a new way of recovering documents which had been deleted from or overwritten on a document management system. The application for the patent (which (if successful) establishes the scope of any patent protection that is ultimately granted) couched the new method in terms of a computer system only.

The issue arose because the law, as implemented in the UK by section 1(2) of the Patents Act 1977, says that certain things are to be excluded from the “patentable inventions” category. The list includes:

“(c) schemes, rules and methods for performing mental acts, playing games or doing business, and programs for computers; and (d) presentations of information".

For those of you who have been following these cases, you’ll remember that the Court of Appeal, in the Aerotel case in which it was trying to decide how to apply section 1(2), came up with a four step test of patentability:

1. Properly construe the scope of the patent applied for;

2. Identify the “new” contribution the invention makes to the field;

3. Ask whether the invention falls solely within the categories excluded by section 1(2); and

4. Check whether the invention meets the requirement for the invention to have some “technical effect”.

So, the court in Kapur duly attempted to apply this four-step test, and, in doing so, it had to look at whether the invention was excluded on the grounds that it was a “method for performing mental acts”.

In previous case law, this had been interpreted both widely and narrowly. Should the exclusion from patentability be narrowly restricted, to methods actually carried out by the human mind, or should it be widened so as to include methods of the kind carried out by the human mind even where in practice it is a computer which carries them out? The judge decided that the narrow interpretation was the correct one. Provided that any patent granted with this scope could not be infringed merely by a third party himself performing some sort of mental act, the exclusion would not apply.

The case is interesting in that it confirms that the courts are minded to construe the “mental act” exclusion narrowly, which is good news for patent holders as they, at least in respect of this exclusion, have a better chance of obtaining the patent if the exclusion is more narrow. Of course, the pragmatic conclusion is that it’s likely that many inventions of this kind are likely to be excluded under the “business method” exclusion in any event, but that is a whole new post in the making!

Fair Commentary?

Everyone seems to have a view at the moment on the ongoing Harry Potter litigation between JK Rowling and Steven Vander Ark, the maker of the Harry Potter Lexicon. Ms. Rowling and Warner Brothers Entertainment, the company that produces the Harry Potter movies, are suing Mr. Vander Ark’s publisher, RDR Books, to prevent publication of the Harry Potter Lexicon (an encyclopedia of words and phrases from the Harry Potter books).

Joan Smith in the Independent commends Ms Rowling for standing up for authors’ rights. Ms Smith points out that the typical British author earns 33% less than the national average wage and comments that Ms Rowling is "defending the rights of thousands of writers, most of whom don’t earn enough to live on".

Others have been more sceptical about the motives behind the litigation. Sunny Hostin from CNN comments that "Rowling is a billionaire and Vander Ark is a mere muggle: a librarian", suggesting that Ms Rowling is being greedy and that the case is merely a quest for more money. Ms Rowling has insisted that this case is not about money but about having control over her work.

Although, of what relevance is it that Ms Rowling is a billionaire anyway? Surely this case is about copyright infringement and whether Mr Vander Ark’s use of the Harry Potter stories constitutes fair use? Whilst everyone is busy expressing views on the motives behind the litigation and whether or not the case should have been brought, most appear undecided on the central issue as to whether Ms Rowling’s copyright has actually been infringed. Perhaps this is because, as the judge hearing the case, Judge Robert Patterson, commented "this case is in a murky state of the law". Judge Patterson has even commented, somewhat amusingly considering his profession, that "litigation is not always the best way to solve things".

It is expected that the case could go on for years if either side decide to appeal the decision (which is not expected for some weeks yet) and so it seems that we may be debating the motives for, and hopefully the outcome of, this case for years to come.

Come and Meet us at INTA 2008

The 130th Annual International Trademark Association's Meeting is fast approaching!  This meeting is widely attended by all who work with trade marks and is this year being held in Berlin from 17th to 21st May.  It is estimated that around 8,000 will attend this year's meeting from all over the world in order to network with colleagues and attend the educational programmes and dicussions which are organised each year.

Lawyers from Mills & Reeve attend this event each year and this year the firm will be sending a team of trade mark lawyers consisting of Alasdair Poore, Richard Plaistowe, Rachel Witt and myself.  We have been busy setting up meetings with colleagues from all over the world and are really looking forward to attending INTA 2008 and visiting Berlin.  Please let us know if you will also be attending and would like to set up a meeting with us!

More on EULA hoops

Wendy Grossman writes an intetesting piece in The Guardian today about EULAs, following up on Sarah's recent post on the subject and picking up on the theme of confusing and convoluted drafting.  Wendy says "Eulas are becoming more, not less, important because so many devices mix hardware and software".  She also picks up on Sarah's observation that it's not always the lawyers who are to blame for bad drafting:

"One reason that so many Eulas seem so restrictive and so difficult to read, [Sarah] ... says, is that - contrary to appearances - they're often not drafted by lawyers, but instead pasted together out of pieces of text from other contracts."

When the chips are down

The Mills & Reeve team returned triumphant from the Court of Appeal recently after the Court held in favour of our client by upholding the High Court's decision in the case of (1) Laurence Wrenn (2) Integrated Multi-Media Solutions Ltd v Stephen Landamore [2007] EWHC 1833 (see IPKat's previous post on the High Court case). Rebekah Richards acted for Stephen Landamore in successfully opposing Laurence Wrenn's claim that the High Court had erred in its findings on the ownership of software written by Mr Landamore. Rebekah worked alongside the excellent Giles Fernando of 11 South Square.

I thought now would be a good time to get some inside information from Rebekah on the case. These are my questions with Rebekah's thoughts.

So remind us: what was the background?

In short, it is a software ownership dispute between our client (Mr Landamore) who is a highly skilled software engineer and Mr Wrenn who commissioned the software. The software in question enables OEM in-car audio devices to operate with other branded audio devices. Mr Wrenn is a businessman with an interest in the audio car market. In 1988, Mr Wrenn incorporated a company called In Car Developments Limited ("ICD") to market the interfaces to car manufacturers. From 2001 Mr Landamore wrote computer programs for use in different kinds of in-car audio interfaces which Mr Wrenn marketed through ICD (now insolvent). No written agreement was entered into dealing with the ownership of the software or payment of royalties. Relations between Mr Landamore and Mr Wrenn deteriorated. Mr Wrenn started to argue that he should have access to the source code. Mr Landamore claimed that there were outstanding royalties due to him from Mr Wrenn.

In April 2005, Mr Wrenn and Mr Landamore attempted to settle matters by incorporating a company known as Integrated Multi-Media Solutions Limited ("IMMS") and entering into an agreement known as the IMMS Agreement. The Agreement contained a clause relating to intellectual property in which the parties acknowledged and accepted that the rights in the software would be owned by IMMS. Mr Wrenn and Mr Landamore were joint shareholders and directors of the company. However, the IMMS Agreement was never brought into effect and IMMS remains a deadlocked company.

Eventually, in April 2006 Mr Wrenn issued High Court proceedings against Mr Landamore claiming that he owned the software and should have access to the source code of the programs. Mr Landamore counterclaimed against Mr Wrenn for unpaid royalties relating to chips which Mr Landamore had programmed with object code for Mr Wrenn.

What was the High Court's decision?

The case was heard by Robert Englehart QC (sitting as a deputy High Court Judge). The Judge held that prior to April 2005, the copyright in the software was owned by Mr Landamore subject to an exclusive royalty-bearing licence in favour of Mr Wrenn. The Judge gave effect to the IMMS Agreement in deciding that, from April 2005, the ownership to the software vested in IMMS.

As the Judge decided that the jointly owned company owned the software, he did not have to rule on the issue of whether it was owned by Mr Wrenn or Mr Landamore. However, he did go on to deal with the question of what terms the court will imply into agreements relating to the ownership of intellectual property, where there was no written agreement dealing with this issue. The Judge adopted the "minimalist approach" set out in the case of Ray v Classic FM (i.e. the court will imply the minimum term necessary to make an agreement between parties workable). In doing this, he concluded that an exclusive licence in favour of Mr Wrenn was all that would have been required to make the agreement work. It would not have been necessary to imply a term that the copyright should have been assigned to Mr Wrenn (which would give him full ownership of the software).

Turning to Mr Landamore's counterclaim for unpaid royalties, the Judge awarded him £45,324.24 plus interest. In reaching this decision, the Judge had to decide whether in making the agreement for Mr Landamore to write the software for the interfaces, Mr Wrenn was acting personally or on behalf of his insolvent company, ICD. Mr Wrenn argued that he was contracting on behalf of ICD and therefore not personally liable to pay Mr Landamore the royalties. Mr Landamore relied on various documents which suggested that Mr Wrenn viewed himself rather than ICD as the contracting party. The evidence on this issue did not paint a consistent picture as it pointed in both directions. However, on balance, the Judge concluded that the arrangement for Mr Landamore to write the software was made between them personally. Although ICD would be marketing the interfaces (and benefiting from the work), it was Mr Wrenn who had engaged Mr Landamore to do the work.

What was the basis of Mr Wrenn's appeal to the Court of Appeal?

Mr Wrenn claimed that the Judge had erred in his findings and appealed to the Court of Appeal on two grounds:

The dealings between him and Mr Landamore relating to the commissioning of the software and programming work were not personal. Instead, Mr Wrenn argued that it was his company (ICD) that had contracted with Mr Landamore and so he should not be liable to pay Mr Landamore the royalties.

The Judge's finding that Mr Wrenn was an exclusive licensee to the software should have given him an entitlement to sue personally for alleged infringements. Mr Wrenn relied on s101 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 ("the CDPA") which allows an exclusive licensee to take advantage of all the rights and remedies available to the copyright owner.

What did the Court of Appeal decide?

The Court of Appeal refused Mr Wrenn's appeal.

On the first ground of appeal, it had been open to the Judge in the High Court to reach the conclusion that Mr Landamore contracted with Mr Wrenn personally and Mr Wrenn was liable to pay the outstanding royalties. Although the evidence did point in both directions, it was clear that the initial contract was personal and that ICD was Mr Wrenn's vehicle.

On the second ground of appeal, it was not open to Mr Wrenn to argue that he was entitled to sue personally for alleged infringements as an exclusive licensee. This was because, as at April 2005, the copyright in the software vested in IMMS. Mr Wrenn's counsel at trial had conceded in his closing submissions that, if IMMS owns the copyright, no remedy for infringement could be claimed by Mr Wrenn. A further difficulty for Mr Wrenn was that an exclusive licensee is only entitled to sue under s101 CDPA if his licence is in writing and is signed by the copyright owner. Mr Wrenn had no written licence and an implied exclusive licence would not suffice.

Are there any lessons for software developers (or people commissioning software)?

The case highlights the problem with oral contracts and the importance of dealing expressly with IP ownership in written agreements before entering into commercial relationships. It is a lesson that people commissioning software (who have paid for this work) do not necessarily own it.

The starting point is that the first owner of the software is the author (in this case Mr Landamore) unless the author is an employee and creates the work in the course of employment. Ownership remains with the author unless it is transferred by written assignment to the commissioner. Alternatively, the commissioner could have a licence to use the software.

Where the courts are forced to intervene (as in the present case), it will generally apply the minimum term necessary to make the agreement workable (following the principle in Ray v Classic FM). Courts are very reluctant to imply full transfer of copyright to the commissioner which is often what the commissioner will be seeking.

From the software developer's point of view, an agreement clearly recording who is liable to pay royalties and the amount of royalty is clearly advisable. Otherwise, the court will have to look at the evidence of both parties (which may well be contradictory, as it was in the present case) before reaching a decision. All in all, the message is that written agreements dealing with important issues such as IP ownership helps avoid the need for time-consuming litigation to determine ownership when the relationship deteriorates.

UK delays anti-hacking laws

The Home Office has again postponed legislation to amend the Computer Misuse Act which would in particular address the need for the criminalisation of denial of service attacks and the selling of hacking tools. The delay is caused by a fear that the changes might overlap with the Serious Crime Bill and criminalise legitimate security professionals.

Predictably, shadow home affairs spokesman James Brokenshire has criticised the delay, stating that it suggested that the UK was a “soft touch on cyber crime” and that “current Government inaction and inertia is putting us all at greater risk.”

The announcement of the delay coincides with a reminder from the US of the risks of cyber crime. Michael Chertoff, the US Homeland Security Secretary, this week compared the potential effects of cyber crime on the United States to the tragic effects of 9/11. Speaking at the RSA Conference in San Francisco he commented that "we take threats to the cyber world as seriously as we take threats to the material world".

O what a tangled web we weave ...

I hate to blow my own trumpet but I was rather chuffed today to read on the BBC news website of signs that my Microsoft v Yahoo predictions might be ringing true.

It turns out that Yahoo has cleverly done a deal with the enemy - Google - which will see Google being able to place advertising alongside 3% of  Yahoo search results. The market obviously thinks this is a smart move; Yahoo shares have increased by 7%. It's hard to see how this can have any result other than to force Microsoft to increase its offer, which is what Yahoo has been hoping for all along.

Microsoft hasn't been sitting idle, however - turns out that it is in talks with News Corp about making a joint offer for Yahoo, which would combine the MSN, MySpace and Yahoo sites under one umbrella (what would the compeitition authorities have to say about that, I wonder?).

Microsoft will get its prize in the end, I think, but by the looks of things it's going to have to reach deeper into its pockets than it's doing at the moment ...